



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12



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
WESTERN DIVISION

13 )  
14 ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *ex rel.* )  
15 ) [UNDER SEAL], )  
16 Plaintiff, )  
17 v. )  
18 )  
19 [UNDER SEAL], )  
20 )  
21 Defendant. )  
22 )  
23 )  
24 )  
25 )  
26 )  
27 )  
28 )

CV13-09173 FMO (SSX)  
Case No. \_\_\_\_\_  
FILED UNDER SEAL

Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3729  
(False Claims Act)

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5 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
6 **FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
6 **WESTERN DIVISION**

7 )  
8 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *ex rel.* )  
9 KEVIN CODY )  
9 MUGE CODY )  
10 42318 Iron Bit Place )  
11 Chantilly, Virginia 20152, )  
12 Plaintiff, )  
13 )  
14 v. )

15 ) MANTECH INTERNATIONAL )  
16 CORPORATION, )  
17 ) 12015 Lee Jackson Highway )  
18 Fairfax, Virginia 22033 )  
19 )  
20 **Serve: Registered Agent:** )  
21 ) C T Corporation System )  
22 818 West Seventh Street )  
22 2nd Floor )  
23 Los Angeles, California 90017 )  
24 )  
25 )  
26 )  
27 )  
28 )

)  
Case No. \_\_\_\_\_  
**FILED UNDER SEAL**

)  
Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3729  
(False Claims Act)

## Introduction

1. Qui tam relators Kevin and Muge Cody, by and through their attorneys, individually and on behalf of the United States of America, file this complaint against ManTech International Corporation to recover damages, penalties, and attorneys' fees for violations of the federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 *et seq.*

2. ManTech is a leading government contractor that specializes in providing technological services to the United States government.

3. Since being founded in 1968, ManTech has grown to become one of the U.S. military's leading providers for operational support in southwest Asia, most notably in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom.

4. ManTech's largest contract involves the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected family of vehicles (MRAP).

5. On September 11, 2012, following a GAO Protest Decision in which ManTech was the non-moving party, ManTech was awarded Contract W56HZV-12-C-0127 (MRAP CLSS contract or the contract), valued at \$618 million for the first 14 months of the contract

6. The total contract value is \$2.85 billion over five years, if all options are exercised

1       7. Under the MRAP CLSS contract, ManTech was required to provide  
2 vehicle support maintenance for over 15,000 MRAP vehicles in Afghanistan and  
3 Kuwait.

4       8. In order to accomplish this task, ManTech was required to (1) provide  
5 deployment and operations support for more than 1,000 employees throughout  
6 Afghanistan and Kuwait; (2) provide field level maintenance for the MRAP vehicles;  
7 (3) provide sustainment level maintenance for the MRAP vehicles; (4) provide battle  
8 damage assessment and repair services; and (5) provide repair part supplies and  
9 management of those supplies in Afghanistan and Kuwait.

10     9. ManTech has two operating business groups, one of which is the  
11 Technical Services Group (TSG).

12     10. The Global Contingency Operations division (GCO) is a subdivision  
13 within the TSG Systems Sustainment and Integrated Logistics (SSILOG) Business  
14 Unit (BU).

15     11. During the proposal phase of the contract, Relator Kevin Cody served at  
16 ManTech as the Business Unit (BU) President and General Manager (GM) for the  
17 TSG SSILOG Business Unit.

18     12. The SSILOG BU is one of four business units within TSG.

19     13. Kevin Cody's wife, co-Relator Muge Cody, worked within the GCO as  
20 the Vice President for Ground Systems Operations.

1       14. In executing their work-related responsibilities, both Kevin and Muge  
2 Cody discovered defective pricing in the contract which led to substantial violations  
3 by ManTech of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 *et seq.*  
4

5       15. Because Kevin and Muge Cody's discovered and protested ManTech's  
6 fraudulent conduct in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 *et seq.*, ManTech subjected both  
7 Kevin and Muge Cody to a series of retaliatory acts in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§  
8 3730(h).  
9

10      16. ManTech's GCO Division, within the TSG, falsely manipulated the  
11 Fringe Rates for the MRAP CLSS proposal submitted by ManTech in September  
12 2011, and subsequently revised pursuant to numerous Evaluation Notice Discussions  
13 (ENDs) with the U.S. government, in order to win the resultant contract.  
14

15      17. ManTech knowingly and falsely depressed their Fringe Rate from an  
16 expected 60% to 47% as a part of ManTech's Price to Win (PTW) strategy for the  
17 MRAP CLSS contract.  
18

19      18. ManTech developed this strategy to lower its labor rates for professional  
20 services and reduce its fringe costs by over \$12 million in order to win the new  
21 contract, by not including all of the Hazardous and Isolation (Haz/Iso) pay as planned  
22 Fringe expenses.  
23

24      19. After the award of the MRAP CLSS contract, ManTech knowingly and  
25 falsely reported the intentionally depressed Fringe Rate overages, pursuant to the  
26  
27

1 actual costs incurred on the contracts, as unplanned increases in the Fringe rates via  
2 Variance Rate Revenue charges, which the U.S. Government paid.  
3

4 20. For just two months, December 2012 and February 2013, the total  
5 Variance Revenue charges falsely billed to the government were \$3,180,632.63.  
6

7 21. All of these costs and more should have been included by ManTech in  
8 the original proposal and the resultant MRAP CLSS contract.  
9

10 22. During the period of January 2013 through September 2013, ManTech  
11 knowingly made several false statements and submitted nine (9) fraudulent invoices  
12 or false claims totally about \$6 million, in order to inappropriately recover indirect  
13 cost shortfalls, due to its earlier fraudulent underpricing on the MRAP CLSS  
14 proposal to win the contract award.  
15

16 23. In connection with the filing of this original Complaint, the Relators  
17 have furnished the United States with substantially all material evidence and  
18 information in the Relators' possession.  
19

20 **Jurisdiction and Venue**  
21

22 24. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 31  
23 U.S.C. §§ 3730 and 3732.  
24

25 25. This Court has personal jurisdiction over ManTech pursuant to 31  
26 U.S.C. § 3732 (a) because ManTech transacts business in this judicial district.  
27  
28

26. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3732 (a) and under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) because ManTech transacts business in the Western Division of this judicial district.

## Parties

27. Relators Kevin and Muge Cody are both residents of the Commonwealth of Virginia, residing at 42318 Iron Bit Place, Chantilly, VA 20152.

28. Both Kevin and Muge Cody represent an “original source” of this information within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B), and state that to their knowledge, the information contained herein has not been publicly disclosed.

29. Kevin Cody began working for ManTech in 1990.

30. In June 2008, ManTech promoted Kevin Cody to Senior Vice President of the Operating Unit, and then to Business Unit General Manager within the Technical Services Group.

31. Muge Cody is the Division Vice President for Ground Systems Operations Division, the division that includes the MRAP CISS contract.

22       32. As part of their professional responsibilities, both Kevin and Muge Cody  
23 are responsible for signing off on all finalized cost proposal details for the contract,  
24 and thus have intimate knowledge of the fraudulent underbid of the contract.  
25

1           33. The Codys are currently employed by ManTech, and thus have direct  
2 knowledge of the false records, statements and claims ManTech has presented to the  
3 Government.  
4

5           34. ManTech is a \$3 billion government contractor responsible for providing  
6 various technological services to the U.S. Government.  
7

8           35. ManTech is headquartered at 12015 Lee Jackson Highway, Fairfax,  
9 Virginia 22033.  
10

11          36. Founded in 1968, ManTech has a long history of performing highly  
12 technical cost-reimbursement contracts on behalf of the U.S. military.  
13

14          37. ManTech's largest contract involves the MRAP Family of Vehicles  
15 contract.  
16

17          38. In 2011 and 2012, the contract represented one-fifth of ManTech's  
18 revenue and one-eighth of the company's personnel.  
19

20          39. In 2013, the contract remains a large contributor to the indirect  
21 generation of TSG and ManTech International business capital for company  
22 operations.  
23

### Factual Allegations

25          **ManTech violated the Federal Acquisition Regulations during the proposal  
26 period.**

27          40. Pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and the Defense  
28 Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) Audit Manual, all government contractors wishing

1 to obtain a cost-reimbursement contract must disclose all cost and pricing  
2 information in their proposals for review by U.S. Government source selection  
3 personnel.  
4

5 41. The disclosures are required to be consistent with the Forward Pricing  
6 Rate Agreement (FRPA), and must include the cost and pricing information for the  
7 FRPA.  
8

9 42. This specifically includes any build-up information for all direct labor  
10 costs, other direct costs, and indirect costs, including but not limited to General and  
11 Administrative (G&A) and Fringe Expenses (GCO Fringe or Fringe rates).  
12  
13

14 43. A Fringe Rate is typically described as a percentage, and consists of the  
15 cost of an employee's benefits, divided by his/her wages.  
16  
17

18 44. Fringe Benefits (i.e., the numerator) include the cost of paid vacation,  
19 holidays, and sick days.  
20  
21

22 45. In addition, Fringe Benefits include the annual costs of the following  
23 benefits: health (medical, dental, and vision) insurance; life insurance; and disability  
24 insurance.  
25  
26

27 46. Hazardous and Isolation pay (Haz/Iso), when provided for working in a  
28 hazardous location such as Afghanistan, is typically applied to the Direct Labor or  
Other Direct Cost (ODC), not the Fringe Benefits.  
29

1           47. It is the policy of ManTech, pursuant to its Cost Accounting Standards  
2 (CAS) Disclosure Statements, to apply Haz/Iso pay to direct labor costs, not to Fringe  
3 Benefits.  
4

5           48. ManTech failed to abide by the requirements of FAR 30.201-3 *et seq.*,  
6 by improperly depressing its final bid price by approximately \$12 million.  
7

8           49. In the September 2011 MRAP CLSS proposal, ManTech falsely  
9 depressed its bid by knowingly allocating funds for only the first 40 hours of Haz/Iso  
10 pay, not the full 84 hours of Haz/Iso pay to which each employee working in  
11 Afghanistan under the MRAP contract was then entitled under the CLSS bridge  
12 contract.  
13

14           50. ManTech falsely underfunded the incumbent employee compensation by  
15 adopting an average Direct Labor (DL) rate for the bridge contract and applying this  
16 forward to the competitive proposal.  
17

18           51. ManTech did this knowing the bid proposal contained a Haz/Iso  
19 calculation changed from all hours worked for the 84 hour-work week, to only 40  
20 hours of funded compensation per week.  
21

22           52. This fraudulent cost depression permitted ManTech to lower its cost  
23 within the Global Contingency Operations Cost Segment.  
24

1       53. ManTech had full knowledge that it planned to actually pay each of its  
2 employees working in Afghanistan Haz/Iso pay on all 84 hours worked within a one  
3 week period.  
4

5       54. Thus, ManTech falsely understated its planned Fringe Rate by 44 hours  
6 of Haz/Iso pay for each weekly period for each of the thousand-plus employees it  
7 planned to perform services in Afghanistan for the period of the MRAP CLSS  
8 contract.  
9

10      55. In disclosing cost and pricing information that deliberately understated  
11 the value of incumbent compensation, ManTech knowingly violated the provisions of  
12 FAR 30.201-3 *et seq.*  
13

14      **ManTech's Price to Win Strategy (PTW) caused its executives to keep the  
15 deflated Fringe Rate during the proposal period.**

16      56. As evidenced by its Price to Win (PTW) Workbook, ManTech  
17 executives believed ManTech would significantly increase its chance of winning the  
18 MRAP contract by lowering the final bid price by \$12 million.  
19

20      57. ManTech's Price to Win strategy reduced ManTech's Fringe expense  
21 from \$37 million to \$25 million, while simultaneously allowing it to artificially lower  
22 its billing rate for its professional services.  
23

24      58. ManTech's PTW strategy drove ManTech's executive to develop a new  
25 cost segment titled Global Contingency Operations (GCO), per ManTech's PTW  
26 Workbook, CLSS-PTW Model, July 28, 2011, in order to offer lower rate structures  
27  
28

1 to reduce ManTech's cost and increase its probability of winning the MRAP CLSS  
2 contract.  
3

4 59. Following the September 2011 submission of ManTech's proposal, the  
5 U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) began asking  
6 ManTech to clarify the cost and information data used to calculate the September  
7 2011 proposal via a series of Evaluation Notice Discussions (ENDs).  
8

9 60. Concerned that the ENDs would result in ManTech being forced to raise  
10 its labor rates to accommodate lost compensation generally derived from Haz/Iso  
11 uplifts on the full 84 hours on the September 2011 proposal, ManTech reduced the  
12 DL employee rates, driving down compensation on the pre-existing MRAP CLSS  
13 bridge contract.  
14

15 61. In doing so, ManTech hoped to avoid a noticeable discrepancy in total  
16 employee compensation requested by TACOM between the September 2011  
17 proposal and the current CLSS bridge contract.  
18

19 62. ManTech was able to keep the false \$12 million price "reduction" as  
20 part of its PTW strategy, and continued to misrepresent the expected performance  
21 costs under the September 2011 proposal.  
22

1     **In approximately March 2012, Kevin Cody discovered, and reported, the**  
2     **discrepancy in the Fringe Rate; but ManTech executives dismissed his report**  
3     **and did nothing to change the \$12 million understatement; Muge Cody raised**  
4     **similar concerns and ManTech dismissed her concerns.**

5  
6  
7       63. In February 2012, TACOM expressed concern that ManTech's  
September 2011 proposal would be insufficient to retain a loyal workforce to execute  
the MRAP contract.

8  
9  
10      64. To ensure workforce loyalty, ManTech first elected to add additional  
labor premiums of \$1,500 per person per month to its September 2011 bid.

11  
12      65. As part of the executive team responsible for ensuring workforce  
retention, Kevin Cody was asked to develop an internal pricing strategy to fully fund  
the added premium labor costs.

13  
14      66. ManTech Business Operations, under Bonnie Cook, included the  
premium labor costs into the GCO fringe cost segment instead of including it into the  
Direct Labor (DL) Category.

15  
16      67. Upon adding the premium labor costs into the GCO Fringe cost segment  
instead of the DL labor category, Kevin Cody discovered that ManTech had  
incorrectly calculated the GCO Fringe Rate.

17  
18      68. He did not immediately understand how this had occurred.

19  
20      69. After further review, Kevin Cody brought the issue to Jim Maguire, the  
Vice-President of Finance Operation and TSG Compliance; Bonnie Cook, the Senior

1 Vice-President; Chris Williamson, one of Jim Maguire's direct reports; and C.W.  
2 Etzler, the Vice-President of Corporate Pricing.

3  
4 70. These executives dismissed Kevin Cody's concerns, and ManTech did  
5 nothing to change the \$12 million understatement in its September 2011 proposal.

6  
7 71. On March 26, 2012, Kevin Cody again raised the issue of the GCO  
8 Fringe miscalculation to several ManTech executives.

9  
10 72. Between March 6, 2012 and March 26, 2012, Kevin Cody calculated  
11 that the September 2011 bid proposal did not include the required funds to fully fund  
12 the Haz/Iso pay uplift for all 84 hours.

13  
14 73. Despite Kevin Cody's objections that ManTech had underfunded the  
15 GCO Fringe Rate, ManTech executives continued the underfunding to ensure that  
16 ManTech had a competitive PTW.

17  
18 74. During the same time period, Muge Cody expressed similar concerns to  
19 her managers about ManTech's underfunding of the GCO G&A rate, particular to the  
20 PMO staffing.

21  
22 75. In order to ensure a competitive PTW, ManTech spent the following  
23 month reducing the DL costs to be included in the final bid.

24  
25 76. Notwithstanding Kevin Cody's March 26, 2012 calculation that the  
26 GCO Fringe Rate had been underfunded, ManTech elected to send the final cost and  
27 technical volumes to the U.S. Army on April 24, 2012.

1       77. When it submitted the final proposal, ManTech knew that the GCO  
2 Fringe Costs were underfunded, as only \$25,939,636 of the roughly \$37 million  
3 required to fully fund the 84 hours of Haz/Iso pay was requested.  
4

5       78. To make up the underfunding, ManTech eventually began accumulating,  
6 and then subsequently billing the Government for, so-called Variance Revenue Rate  
7 charges as ManTech executed a “true-up” of costs.  
8

9 **ManTech knowingly and falsely reported GCO Fringe Rate deficits as Variance  
10 Rate Revenue charges.**

11     79. ManTech falsely used lowered GCO Fringe Revenue Rates to help them  
12 win the MRAP CLSS contract.  
13

14     80. After contract award, ManTech reported the higher Fringe expenses as  
15 Variance Rate expenses.  
16

17     81. Variance Rate charges are common, as operating costs can legitimately  
18 fluctuate for many reasons, such as increases in health care cost, disability insurance  
19 costs, and other factors.  
20

21     82. In order to recoup the 44 hours of Haz/Iso pay that ManTech  
22 deliberately excluded from its final proposal in April 2012, ManTech began billing  
23 the U.S. Government for the Haz/Iso pay as “Variance Rate” charges, even though  
24 the charges were predicted and expected by ManTech and did not result from any  
25 kind of legitimate fluctuation in operating costs.  
26  
27

1       83. From November 5, 2012, through December 31, 2012, ManTech's GCO  
2 division expended an unbudgeted amount of \$934,785.11 for its Fringe Rate.  
3

4       84. The \$934,785.11 was unbudgeted in the GCO Fringe Rate because  
5 ManTech deliberately requested less than the full 84 hours of Haz/Iso pay that  
6 ManTech intended to pay, and did pay, to each incumbent employee working in  
7 Afghanistan under the MRAP contract, in accordance with ManTech's cost proposal.  
8

9       85. To make-up for this deficit, ManTech charged the U.S. Government for  
10 the 44 unbudgeted hours per employee per pay period in the GCO Fringe costs as  
11 Variance Revenue in the amount of \$934,785.11 during 2012 for the CPFF portion of  
12 the contract.  
13

14       86. ManTech has continued billing the U.S. Government for Variance  
15 Revenue from January 1, 2013 to present for these predicted and expected GCO  
16 Fringe costs.  
17

18       87. All of the GCO Fringe costs billed by ManTech as Variance Revenue on  
19 the MRAP CLSS contract have been falsely billed as unplanned allowable Variance  
20 Revenue.  
21

22       88. All planned Fringe expenses should be fully disclosed to the U.S.  
23 Government in the Forward Pricing Rate proposal and in the contractor's proposal for  
24 all cost-reimbursement and time-and-material contracts.  
25  
26  
27  
28

1           89. Failure to fully disclose current, accurate, and complete cost and price  
2 information in a cost-reimbursement and time-and-materials (T&M) contract is a  
3 basis for fraud and is defective pricing in U.S. Federal government contracts,  
4 pursuant to the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA).

5 **In 2013, ManTech knowingly made several false statements and submitted nine  
6 fraudulent invoices or false claims totaling about \$6 million, in order to  
7 inappropriately recover indirect cost shortfalls, due to its earlier fraudulent  
8 underpricing on the MRAP CLSS proposal.**

9           10 90. From January 2013 through September 2013, ManTech knowingly made  
11 several false statements and submitted nine (9) fraudulent monthly invoices or false  
12 claims to the U.S. Army, totaling about \$6 million, in order to inappropriately  
13 recover indirect cost shortfalls, due to its fraudulent underpricing on the MRAP  
14 CLSS proposal to win the contract award.

15           16 91. In a letter to TACOM dated July 23, 2013, ManTech falsely stated to the  
17 U.S. Government, “It is not ManTech’s intention to change our DCAA approved  
18 billing rates at this time.”

19           20 92. ManTech made another false statement in a letter to the U.S. Army  
21 dated August 9, 2013, when it stated, “The indirect rates used are the DCAA  
22 provisional approved rates with an applied indirect rate variance estimate.”

23           24 93. These statements are false because ManTech’s internal emails show that  
25 during the June 2013 to July 2013 period, ManTech was preparing to submit a new  
26 rate proposal to DCAA for a new Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA).

1           94. In fact, ManTech submitted the proposed new FPRA rates to DCAA in  
2 early August 2013.  
3

4           95. DCAA approved the new FPRA rates later in August 2013.  
5

6           96. On September 16, 2013, ManTech increased the GCO Fringe and G&A  
7 rates, retroactively from January 1, 2013, which increased invoiced costs to TACOM  
8 in the amounts of \$3,993,574 (GCO Fringe) and \$1,943,108 (G&A) through  
9 September 6, 2013.  
10

11          97. Retroactive indirect rate cost increases may be deemed allowable, if  
12 properly incurred and reported.  
13

14          98. But ManTech made these retroactive rate revisions and revised its Cost  
15 Accounting Standards (CAS) Disclosure Statement in an effort to inappropriately  
16 comingle the increased GCO and IS cost centers, allowing ManTech to shift more  
17 incurred costs from TSG-wide contracts based in the IS cost center to the U.S.M.C.  
18 Fixed Price Contract and the Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) TACOM CLSS MRAP  
19 contract.  
20

21          99. ManTech will utilize the new set of 2013 FRPA rates to invoice GCO  
22 costs through the remainder of 2013.  
23

24          100. On March 15, 2013, ManTech invoiced the Government \$928,345 for  
25 variance accrued during 2012.  
26  
27  
28

1           101. As of September 6, 2013, ManTech has defrauded the U.S. Government  
2 via GCO Fringe variance rates a total of \$4,921,919, with a projected sum of  
3 \$5,922,813.37 by December 31, 2013.  
4

5           102. ManTech has invoiced retrospective G&A rates from the August 2013  
6 FPRA as a distinct and separate \$1,943,108, bringing the total current and projected  
7 damages through December 31, 2013 to \$7,865,921.37.  
8

9           103. Prior to submission of October 2013's invoice, ManTech collapsed the  
10 GCO cost center and has now invoiced the TACOM MRAP CLSS contract with  
11 2013 IS rates - fringe, G&A, MH, and OH.  
12

13           104. This substantially increases the post-award false claims submitted by  
14 ManTech to \$18,598,042, representing invoiced costs increases from January 1, 2013  
15 through November 8, 2013.  
16

17           105. This unilateral action by ManTech violates FAR 30.401, Consistency in  
18 Estimating, Accumulating, and Reporting Costs, and FAR 30.402, Consistency in  
19 Allocating Costs Incurred for the Same Purpose, in effect on the date of award of the  
20 contract.  
21

22           106. The \$18,598,042 in false claims by ManTech is in addition to the more  
23 than \$12 million in costs that ManTech has begun to charge as "true up" fringe to  
24 offset its fraudulent underbidding.  
25  
26

1           107. ManTech knowingly, intentionally, and repeatedly made false  
2 statements and false claims to the U.S. Government in a coordinated effort to recover  
3 costs which were underpriced on the CLSS MRAP contract.  
4

5           108. ManTech attempted to mask these additional indirect cost variances as  
6 appropriate cost variances.  
7

8           109. ManTech has repeatedly falsely stated in letters and emails to the U.S.  
9 Army TACOM procurement office and DCAA that the indirect rate increases were  
10 caused by the Government's actions, specifically the U.S. Army's request after  
11 contract award in April 2013 for the de-obligation of funds tied to the Afghanistan  
12 drawdown of forces and related support services.  
13

14           110. ManTech deliberately did not fully or adequately address the U.S.  
15 Government's requests for cost information.  
16

17           111. As a part of ManTech's proposal for the CLSS MRAP contract,  
18 ManTech certified in its K-9 and K-10 Cost Accounting Standards (CAS)  
19 Certifications that it would adhere to all GCO cost accounting practices and contract  
20 award would not "result in a required or unilateral change in cost accounting  
21 practice."  
22

23           112. But in December 2012, ManTech submitted a revised GCO CAS  
24 Disclosure Statement in which it unilaterally changed the GCO cost accounting  
25 practice.  
26

1           113. ManTech appropriately submitted the CAS Disclosure Statement to  
2 DCAA and DCMA, but chose not to disclose the cost impact to the U.S. Army  
3 TACOM Contracting Officer.  
4

5           114. ManTech has for years, according to its CAS Disclosure Statements,  
6 grouped OCONUS and CONUS direct labor cost and fringe cost together.  
7

8           115. But for the CLSS MRAP proposal, ManTech created a new GCO cost  
9 center, which separated the direct labor cost from the fringe cost.  
10

11          116. This cost accounting change was disclosed via a revised CAS Disclosure  
12 Statement.  
13

14          117. For ManTech's PTW strategy, it needed the lowest labor rates feasible  
15 for its proposal and wanted to artificially drive down its fringe rate to 23.8%.  
16

17          118. In 2012, after the contract award, ManTech submitted a revised GCO  
18 CAS Disclosure Statement that merged the new GCO cost center with the IS cost  
19 center and created new increased FPRA rates, which increased the GCO fringe rate to  
20 30%.  
21

22          119. This was not disclosed to the TACOM Contracting Officer as required  
23 by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, nor reviewed or approved by DCAA.  
24

25          120. This fringe rate increase is not properly or reasonably distributed in  
26 proportion to the benefits received, especially when the fringe rate for the GCO  
27  
28

1 ManTech CLSS MRAP contract remained virtually unchanged at 30%, while all  
2 other cost centers fringe rates were reduced by 5%.

3       121. FAR 31.203(e) provided that “... Contractors must notify the  
4 Contracting Officer (CO) and the cognizant DCAA auditor of planned changes prior  
5 to implementation. Contractors should consider pursuing an advance agreement with  
6 the CO when changing allocation methods.”

7       **ManTech retaliated against the Codys because they protested ManTech’s  
8 fraudulent underbidding and false claims.**

9           **a. After Kevin Cody protested ManTech’s actions, ManTech management  
10 circulated false rumors that he planned to resign.**

11       122. Since November 2012, ManTech management has circulated false  
12 rumors that Kevin Cody planned to resign from ManTech.

13       123. These rumors began soon after Kevin Cody complained about  
14 ManTech’s fraudulent underbidding on the contract and raised concerns about  
15 associated violations of internal financial controls and accounting principles during  
16 the MRAP FOV CLSS proposal and bidding process.

17       124. In 2012, as detailed above, Kevin Cody made several inquiries and  
18 complaints about ManTech’s proposal on the MRAP FOV CLSS contract.

19       125. Kevin Cody’s supervisors were familiar with each area of concern, as  
20 Kevin Cody diligently made his concerns known both prior to proposal and after  
21 contract award.

1           126. During the proposal process, Kevin Cody said he was concerned that  
2 ManTech had failed to adequately increase the premium fringe rate, with the result  
3 that millions of dollars that should have been included in the proposal were not  
4 included.

6           127. Kevin Cody expressed his belief that ManTech was aware that the  
7 premium was 100% higher than the bid proposal.

9           128. Kevin Cody expressed his belief that DL (Direct Labor) rates were too  
10 low in the proposal, because the DL rates were based on greening efforts prior to  
11 proposal and award.

13           129. Kevin Cody expressed his concern that the costs proposed to cover  
14 indirect personnel were insufficient, because such costs only showed 14 personnel in  
15 the Personnel Management Office (PMO) when there were in fact 60.

18           130. In February 2013, Kevin Cody also told ManTech management that his  
19 concerns about the fraudulent underbidding also made him concerned that  
20 ManTech's SEC-required internal financial controls had failed, and this failure of  
21 internal controls could harm ManTech's shareholders.

23           131. ManTech leadership initiated false rumors that Kevin Cody planned to  
24 resign, and did so because he had expressed his concerns about the fraudulent  
25 underbidding and the associated failures of ManTech's internal financial controls and  
26 internal accounting procedures.

1           **b. After Muge Cody protested ManTech's actions, ManTech management  
2           circulated false rumors that she planned to resign.**

3           132. Since late 2012, ManTech management has circulated false rumors that  
4           Muge Cody planned to resign from ManTech.  
5

6           133. These rumors began soon after Muge Cody complained about  
7           ManTech's fraudulent underbidding on the contract and raised concerns about  
8           associated violations of internal financial controls and accounting principles during  
9           the MRAP FOV CLSS proposal and bidding process.  
10

11           134. Muge Cody frequently expressed her concerns to her supervisors about  
12           ManTech's ability to carry true labor costs and fringe costs on the contract.  
13

14           135. Muge Cody expressed her concern that ManTech's proposed costs to  
15           cover indirect personnel were insufficient, because such costs only showed 14  
16           personnel in PMO when there were 60.  
17

18           136. In February 2013, Muge Cody also told ManTech management that her  
19           concerns about the fraudulent underbidding also made her concerned that ManTech's  
20           SEC-required internal financial controls had failed, and this failure of internal  
21           controls could harm ManTech's shareholders.  
22

23           137. ManTech leadership initiated rumors false rumors that Muge Cody  
24           planned to resign, and did so because she had expressed her concerns about the  
25           fraudulent underbidding and the associated failures of ManTech's internal financial  
26           controls and internal accounting procedures.  
27  
28

1           **c. ManTech moved Muge Cody's division away from Kevin Cody's area of  
2 responsibility following the Codys' protected activity, significantly  
3 diminishing Kevin Cody's responsibilities.**

4           138. Following the Codys' complaints regarding ManTech's fraudulent  
5 underbidding and its failed internal financial controls, ManTech moved Muge Cody's  
6 division under the supervision of Senior Vice President and Program Executive  
7 Michael Brogan.

8           139. As a result of this move, Kevin Cody no longer managed the MRAP  
9 FOV contract, and ManTech had significantly diminished his responsibilities.

10          140. Kevin Cody asked Lou Addeo, the TSG Chief Operating Officer and  
11 President, to explain the reason for Kevin Cody's diminished responsibilities.

12          141. Addeo said that it was inappropriate for Kevin Cody to manage his wife,  
13 Muge Cody.

14          142. Kevin Cody responded that he and Muge Cody had been married for  
15 over six years, their relationship had never caused any performance issues, and Muge  
16 Cody had always worked under him as they grew the MRAP FOV business.

17          143. ManTech reassigned Muge Cody and diminished Kevin Cody's  
18 responsibilities as retaliation for their previous expressions of concern about  
19 ManTech's fraudulent underbidding and its failed internal financial controls.

1           **d. ManTech retaliated against Muge Cody by excluding her from important  
2 emails related to the MRAP CLSS program, thus diminishing her  
3 responsibilities; and ManTech further reduced her duties after she  
complained about the exclusion.**

4           144. Following Muge Cody's reassignment away from Kevin Cody on  
5 December 19, 2012, Muge Cody fell under the supervision of Program Executive  
6 Michael Brogan.

7           145. Nate Webster was hired as Muge Cody's deputy, effective January 28,  
8 2013, although ManTech told Webster to report directly to Brogan.

9           146. After Muge Cody's retaliatory reassignment to Brogan, Brogan  
10 repeatedly excluded Muge Cody from important emails regarding business  
11 operations, while including Muge Cody's deputy, Webster.

12           147. Muge Cody complained to Human Resources about the retaliatory  
13 exclusion and met with HR representatives to attempt to resolve the issue.

14           148. Despite Muge Cody's repeated complaint to her Human Resources  
15 representatives, ManTech continues to exclude her from meetings and business  
16 decisions, and has deliberately not provided her with financial documents she needs  
17 to effectively perform her job functions.

18           149. Brogan's exclusion of Muge Cody from important emails regarding  
19 business operations is retaliation for her previous expressions of concern about  
20 ManTech's fraudulent underbidding and its failed internal financial controls.  
21  
22  
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1           150. Since complaining about her exclusion from important decisions  
2 regarding her proper business functions, Muge Cody's input has been summarily  
3 dismissed by Brogan, Bonnie Cook, and Sandra Cogan, another ManTech manager.  
4

5           151. Muge Cody responded to the false accusations by again complaining of  
6 retaliation to her Human Resources representative, reiterating that ManTech had  
7 intentionally underbid the contract, and that the issues for which she was being  
8 blamed stemmed from that fraudulent underbidding.  
9

10          152. The continued harassment of Muge Cody by ManTech's Business  
11 Operations Unit management is retaliation for her expressions of concern regarding  
12 ManTech's fraudulent underbidding and its failed internal financial controls, and for  
13 her complaints about prior retaliation.  
14

15          153. On June 26, 2013, Muge Cody met with Dan Keefe, the newly promoted  
16 TSG COO, regarding the retaliation.  
17

18          154. Keefe delivered a written statement in which he summarily dismissed all  
19 complaints filed by Muge Cody to HR; he did not permit any discussion of the  
20 complaints.  
21

22          155. Following the June 26, 2013 meeting, Muge Cody again stated in  
23 writing that ManTech had deliberately underbid the contract.  
24

1           156. Following the June 26, 2013 meeting, Muge Cody again stated in  
2 writing that ManTech had retaliated against her for raising issues regarding  
3 ManTech's failed internal financial controls.  
4

5           157. Following the June 26, 2013 meeting, Muge Cody again said that since  
6 her forced reassignment, Brogan and Cook had diminished her duties.  
7

8           158. Prior to the June 26, 2013 meeting, Muge Cody again said that she had  
9 been bullied and harassed by managers in the Business Operation Unit because she  
10 had expressed her concerns about ManTech's underbidding.  
11

12           159. During the June 26, 2013 meeting, Keefe responded by falsely accusing  
13 Muge Cody of bullying and harassment.  
14

15           **e. ManTech dismissed Kevin Cody's reports of retaliation.**

16           160. On June 26, 2013, Kevin Cody met with Keefe, the newly promoted  
17 TSG COO, to discuss the retaliation Kevin Cody had suffered since disclosing  
18 ManTech's fraudulent underbidding.  
19

20           161. Keefe delivered a written statement in which he summarily dismissed all  
21 complaints filed by Kevn Cody to HR; he did not permit any discussion of the  
22 complaints.  
23

24           162. Following the June 26, 2013 meeting, Kevin Cody again stated that  
25 ManTech had deliberately underbid the contract.  
26  
27  
28

1           163. Following the June 26, 2013 meeting, Kevin Cody again stated that  
2 ManTech had retaliated against him for reporting ManTech's failed internal controls  
3 and its underbidding.  
4

5           164. During the June 26, 2013 meeting, Keefe claimed that neither Kevin  
6 Cody nor Muge Cody had complained about ManTech's internal controls.  
7

8           165. Kevin Cody reiterated that he had complained about internal controls,  
9 and he providing emails outlining his and Muge Cody's previous expressions of  
10 concern.  
11

12           166. Following the June 26, 2013 meeting, Kevin Cody again said that  
13 ManTech had retaliated against him by demoting him on December 19, 2012.  
14

15           **f. In October 2013, ManTech further diminished Kevin Cody's duties.**  
16

17           167. On October 9, 2013, Kevin Cody learned that ManTech planned to  
18 consolidate business units, moving and consolidating SSILOG into an organization  
19 under the direction of Rick Simis.  
20

21           168. Keefe further explained that the change was necessary because Kevin  
22 Cody's business unit was currently valued at only \$10 million per year.  
23

24           169. Kevin Cody's business unit was substantially larger than \$10 million per  
25 year, but it had been significantly reduced by ManTech's earlier retaliation on  
26 December 19, 2012 when ManTech stripped Kevin Cody's unit of the MRAP  
27 business.  
28

1           170. By the October 9, 2013 reorganization, ManTech has further diminished  
2 Kevin Cody's duties, and reduced Kevin Cody's reputation in his field.  
3

4           171. ManTech further diminished Kevin Cody's responsibilities on October  
5 9, 2013 in retaliation for his expressions of concern regarding ManTech's fraudulent  
6 underbidding and its failed internal financial controls, and for his complaints about  
7 prior retaliation.  
8

9

10           **Count I: False Claims Act Violations**  
11           **31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) Against**  
12           **Defendant**

13           172. Kevin Cody and Muge Cody re-allege and incorporate the allegations set  
14 forth above as though fully alleged herein.

15

16           173. ManTech knowingly caused to be presented to the United States  
17 Government false or fraudulent claims for payment or approval under contract  
18 W56HZV-12-C-0127 (MRAP CLSS or "the contract").  
19

20           174. ManTech knowingly and fraudulently induced the United States  
21 Government to award ManTech the MRAP contract, by knowingly and recklessly  
22 providing inaccurate cost and pricing information during the proposal period, in  
23 violation of FAR 30.201-3 *et seq.*  
24

25

26           175. ManTech knowingly and fraudulently induced the United States  
27 Government to award ManTech the MRAP contract, by failing to apply Haz/Iso pay  
28 to direct labor costs, and instead placing this cost center in the fringe benefit

1 category, in violation of ManTech's Cost Accounting Standards Disclosure  
2 Statements.

3  
4 176. ManTech knowingly and fraudulently induced the United States  
5 Government to award ManTech the MRAP contract, by falsely underfunding the  
6 incumbent employee compensation, by adopting an average Direct Labor (DL) rate  
7 for the bridge contract and applying this forward to the competitive proposal; and  
8 ManTech did so knowing the bid proposal contained a changed Haz/Iso calculation  
9 from all hours worked for the 84 hours work week, to only 40 hours of funding per  
10 week.

11  
12 177. ManTech's GCO cost segment, within the TSG, knowingly and  
13 fraudulently manipulated the Fringe Rates for the MRAP CLSS proposal submitted  
14 by ManTech in September 2011, and subsequently revised pursuant to numerous  
15 Evaluation Notice Discussions (ENDs) with the U.S. government, in order to win the  
16 resultant contract.

17  
18 178. ManTech knowingly and falsely depressed their Fringe Rate from an  
19 expected 60% to 47% as a part of ManTech's Price to Win (PTW) strategy for the  
20 MRAP CLSS contract.

21  
22 179. ManTech developed this strategy to lower its labor rates for professional  
23 services and reduce its fringe costs by over \$12 million in order to win the new  
24

1 contract, by not including all of the Hazardous and Isolation (Haz/Iso) pay as planned  
2 Fringe expenses.

3       180. After the award of the MRAP CLSS contract, ManTech knowingly and  
4 falsely reported the intentionally depressed Fringe Rate overages, pursuant to the  
5 actual costs incurred on the contracts, as unplanned increases in the Fringe rates via  
6 Variance Rate Revenue charges, which the U.S. Government paid.

7       181. For just two months, December 2012 and February 2013, the total  
8 Variance Revenue charges falsely billed to the government were \$3,180,632.63.

9       182. All of these costs and more should have been included by ManTech in  
10 the original proposal and the resultant MRAP CLSS contract.

11       183. During the period of January 2013 through September 2013, ManTech  
12 knowingly made several false statements and submitted nine (9) fraudulent invoices  
13 or false claims totally about \$6 million, in order to inappropriately recover indirect  
14 cost shortfalls, due to its earlier fraudulent underpricing on the MRAP CLSS  
15 proposal to win the contract.

16       184. In order to recoup the 44 hours of Haz/Iso pay that ManTech had failed  
17 to request funds for in April 2012, ManTech knowingly caused to be presented to the  
18 United States Government false or fraudulent claims for payment or approval, by  
19 billing the U.S. Government Variance Rate charges to compensate for the *predictable*  
20 budget shortfall.

1           185. ManTech knowingly caused to be presented to the United States  
2 Government false or fraudulent claims for payment or approval on March 15, 2013,  
3 by fraudulently charging \$934,875.11 in Variance Rate charges for the period  
4 November 5, 2012, through December 31, 2012, to compensate for GCO fringe that  
5 was deliberately excluded from the initial bid of the contract.  
6

7           186. ManTech knowingly caused to be presented to the United States  
8 Government false or fraudulent claims for payment or approval on September 16,  
9 2013, by fraudulently charging \$4,921,919 in GCO Fringe Variance Rate charges for  
10 the period January 1, 2013, through September 6, 2014, to compensate for GCO  
11 fringe which was deliberately excluded from the initial bid of the contract.  
12

13           187. The projected sum of fraudulent claims for payment presented to the  
14 United States Government, to compensate for GCO fringe which was deliberately  
15 excluded from the initial bid of the contract, will be \$5,922,813.37 by December 31,  
16 2013.  
17

18           188. ManTech knowingly caused to be presented to the United States  
19 Government false or fraudulent claims for payment or approval on September 16,  
20 2013, by fraudulently invoicing an additional \$1,943,108 in retrospective G&A rates  
21 for the period January 1, 2013, through September 6, 2013, in order to compensate  
22 for G&A funds which was deliberately excluded from the initial bid of the contract.  
23  
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189. ManTech knowingly caused to be presented to the United States Government false or fraudulent claims for payment by invoicing retroactive G&A rates as a distinct and separate \$1,943,108, thus bringing the total current and projected damages through December 31, 2013 to \$7,865,921.37, in order to compensate for GCO Fringe and G&A funds which ManTech deliberately excluded from the initial bid of the contract.

**Count II: False Claims Act Violations**  
**31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) Against  
Defendant**

190. Kevin Cody and Muge Cody re-allege and incorporate the allegations set forth above as though fully alleged herein.

191. ManTech cannot retaliate against an employee who engages in protected conduct under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), by taking lawful actions in furtherance of an FCA action, including investigation for, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed under the FCA.

192. An employee has engaged in protected conduct when litigation under the False Claims Act is a distinct possibility, when the conduct reasonably could lead to a viable FCA action, or when litigation is a reasonable possibility.

193. An employee need not actually file a *qui tam* suit or even know about the protections of section 3730(h) to qualify for protection under the retaliation provision.

1           194. An employee who characterizes the employer's conduct as illegal or  
2 fraudulent, or recommends that legal counsel become involved, engages in protected  
3 conduct.  
4

5           195. As set forth above, and in connection with the foregoing scheme,  
6 ManTech conspired to get fraudulently-induced claims paid or approved by the U.S.  
7 Government, in violation of the False Claims Act.  
8

9           196. Kevin Cody and Muge Cody are both "employees," and ManTech is an  
10 "employer," as those terms are defined by the False Claims Act.  
11

12           197. ManTech unlawfully discriminated against Kevin Cody and Muge Cody,  
13 as a result of the Codys performing lawful acts to stop one or more violations of the  
14 False Claims Act, including reporting to ManTech's leadership the scheme by  
15 ManTech to fraudulently induce, through underbidding, the U.S. Government to  
16 award Mantech the MRAP CLSS contract; and to then disguise its underbidding by  
17 submitting false claims for so-called "variances."  
18  
19

20           198. Kevin Cody and Muge Cody, in good faith, believed that the  
21 underbidding they discovered and reported could have led to violations of the False  
22 Claims Act.  
23  
24

25           199. Kevin Cody and Muge Cody took lawful actions in furtherance of an  
26 FCA action by investigating the underbidding and warning ManTech of the  
27 consequences of the underbidding.  
28

1           200. A reasonable employee in the same or similar circumstances as Kevin  
2 Cody and Muge Cody might believe that ManTech was committing fraud against the  
3 U.S. Government.  
4

5           201. ManTech unlawfully retaliated against Kevin Cody for his lawful acts to  
6 stop one or more violations of the False Claims Act by significantly diminishing his  
7 duties and responsibilities, and harming his professional reputation.  
8

9           202. ManTech unlawfully retaliated against Muge Cody for her lawful acts to  
10 stop one or more violations of the False Claims Act by significantly diminishing her  
11 duties and responsibilities, and harming her professional reputation.  
12

13           203. ManTech's stated reasons for its actions are pretext for retaliation.  
14

15           204. To redress the harms Kevin Cody and Muge Cody have suffered as a  
16 result of the acts and conduct of ManTech in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), Kevin  
17 Cody and Muge Cody are each entitled to damages including two times the amount  
18 of back pay, interest on back pay, and compensation for any special damages,  
19 including emotional distress, and any other damages available by law including  
20 litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.  
21

22

23           **Count III: Violations of the Dodd–Frank**  
24           **Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010**  
25           **Section 922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–6(h) Against Defendant**

26           205. Kevin Cody and Muge Cody re-allege and incorporate the allegations set  
27 forth above as though fully alleged herein.  
28

1           206. ManTech is an “employer” as that term is defined by the Dodd-Frank  
2 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.  
3

4           207. Kevin Cody and Muge Cody both made disclosures to ManTech that are  
5 protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and are thus protected under  
6 Section 922 of Dodd-Frank.  
7

8           208. Those disclosures consist of statements by Kevin Cody and Muge Cody  
9 to ManTech’s leadership that ManTech’s underbidding on the contract resulted from  
10 failures of ManTech’s SEC-required internal financial controls, and this failure of  
11 internal controls could harm ManTech’s shareholders.  
12

13           209. As a result of those disclosures, Kevin Cody and Muge Cody are  
14 protected from retaliation by ManTech under Section 922 of Dodd-Frank.  
15

16           210. ManTech unlawfully retaliated against Kevin Cody, in violation of  
17 Dodd-Frank, for his protected disclosures by significantly diminishing his duties and  
18 responsibilities, and harming his professional reputation.  
19

20           211. ManTech unlawfully retaliated against Muge Cody, in violation of  
21 Dodd-Frank, for her protected disclosures by significantly diminishing her duties and  
22 responsibilities, and harming her professional reputation.  
23

24           212. ManTech’s stated reasons for its actions are pretext for retaliation.  
25

26           213. To redress the harms Kevin Cody and Muge Cody have suffered as a  
27 result of the acts and conduct of ManTech in violation of Section 922 of Dodd-Frank,  
28

1 Kevin Cody and Muge Cody are each entitled to damages including two times the  
2 amount of back pay, interest on back pay, and compensation for any special damages,  
3 including emotional distress, and any other damages available by law including  
4 litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.

5  
6 **PRAAYER FOR RELIEF**  
7

8 WHEREFORE, the Relators, acting on behalf of and in the name of the United  
9 States of America, and on his and her own behalf, pray that judgment be entered  
10 against Defendant for violation of the False Claims Act and the Dodd–Frank Wall  
11 Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 as follows:

- 12
- 13 1. In favor of the United States against Defendant for treble damages to the  
14 Federal Government from the submission of false claims, and the maximum  
15 civil penalties for each violation of the False Claims Act;
  - 16 2. In favor of the Relators for the maximum amount pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §  
17 3730(h) to include reasonable expenses, attorney fees, and costs incurred by  
18 the Relators;
  - 19 3. For all costs of the False Claims Act civil action; and
  - 20 4. In favor of the Relators and the United States for further relief as this court  
21 deems just and equitable; and
- 22
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- 1       5. Economic damages for lost wages and benefits, including two times the
- 2                  amount of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any
- 3                  special damages sustained as a result of the retaliation and reprisal;
- 4
- 5       6. Compensatory (non-economic) damages, including but not limited to
- 6                  damages for emotional distress and loss of reputation;
- 7
- 8       7. Punitive damages to be determined at trial to punish ManTech for malicious
- 9                  acts of retaliation and to deter it from similar retaliatory conduct toward
- 10                 other employees;
- 11
- 12      8. Injunctive or equitable relief, as may be appropriate, to prevent further harm
- 13                  to others and the public caused by ManTech's retaliation against
- 14                 whistleblowers;
- 15
- 16      9. Reasonable litigation costs, expert fees, and reasonable attorneys' fees; and
- 17
- 18      10. Any other such relief that the Court may deem just and equitable.
- 19
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Respectfully submitted,  
THE EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP, P.C.

By:

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## *Counsel for the Relators*

Dated: December 4, 2013.

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via UPS, on this 9<sup>th</sup> day of December 2013, upon:

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